Recent Decisions by unknown
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 24 Issue 1 Article 9 
1955 
Recent Decisions 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Recent Decisions, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 142 (1955). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol24/iss1/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
RECENT DECISIONS
DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT TO SELL-RECOVERY OF BUYER'S Loss ov
RESALE PRoFrrS-GENERAL OR SPECIAL DAMAGEs.-Defendant contracted to sell to
plaintiff a quantity of war surplus cargo rayon parachutes, which type was not avail-
able on the market. The seller failed to deliver the parachutes according to the terms
of the contract. In an action for breach of contract for sale of goods the trial court
held that, since the defendant had had no notice that plaintiffs had contemplated resale
of the goods, the measure of plaintiffs' damages would be the difference between the
contract price and the price at which the defendants resold the goods. From a judg-
ment for plaintiffs, both parties appealed. Held, plaintiff was entitled to recover the
prospective net profits which he would have made on resale of the goods had defend-
ant not breached the contract. Murarka et al. v. Bachrack Bros., Inc., 215 F. 2d 547
(2nd Cir. 1954).
Since this was a diversity of citizenship case, the law to be applied was the law of
New York.1 Where there is a breach of an executory contract to sell and the com-
modity involved is available in a market the measure of damages, "in the absence of
special circumstances showing proximate damages of a greater amount, is the differ-
ence between the contract price and the market or current price at the time and place
of performance"; 2 otherwise the measure of damages "is the loss directly and
naturally resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach of con-
tract."3 These rules, codified in the New York Personal Property Law, are declara-
tory of common law principles4 and incorporate some of those announced in the
landmark English case of Hadley v. Baxendale.5
The lower court,6 sitting without a jury, found that defendant-sellers had no notice
of plaintiff-buyers' contracts to resell or contemplation of such contracts at the time
or prior to contracting, and citing Czarnikow-Rionda Co. v. Federal Sugar Refining
Co.,7 held that, since the seller had no notice of the contemplated resale prior to the
making of the contract, the plaintiff-buyers would not be entitled to the loss of antici-
pated resale profits occasioned by the sellers' breach, such loss being special damages
not contemplated by both parties. The trial court went on to say that the measure
of damages to be applied would be "the difference between the contract price and the
market or current price of the goods at the time or times when they ought to have
been delivered." s There being an absence of a market from which a market price
1. Emerman v. Cohen, et al., 199 F. 2d 857, 858 (2nd Cir. 1952).
2. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 148 (3); Uniform Sales Act § 67 (3).
3. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 148 (2) ; Uniform Sales Act § 67 (2).
4. Melzer v. Zimmerman, et al., 118 Misc. 407, 194 N.Y. Supp. 222 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.
1922) aff'd without opinion 205 App. Div. 886, 198 N.Y. Supp. 932 (1st Dep't 1923);
McCormick, Damages 657 (1935).
5. 9 Ex. 341, 346, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854). That case announced the guiding
principle so far as damages for breach of contract are concerned: they are "such as may
fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally-i.e. according to the usual course
of things, from such breach of contract itself-or such as may reasonably be supposed to
have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract, as the
possible result of the breach." An interesting discussion of the application of the principles
of this case is contained in 15 Fordham L. Rev. 121 (1946).
6. Murarka et al. v. Bachrack Bros., Inc., 111 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
7. 255 N.Y. 33, 173 N.E. 913 (1930).
8. Murarka et al. v. Bacbrack Bros., Inc., 111 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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could be determined, it was reasoned that, "When resale [by the defendant-sellers] is
conducted so as to afford reasonable evidence of market value, and is not too long
after the time for performance of the original contract of sale, market value has
long been computed by resale price of the goods." The appellate court in the course
of its opinion quite correctly attacked this method of computing market value citing
Latimer v. Burrows'o which held that the price received by a defaulting seller who
has resold (in this case the defendant) may not be used as evidence of market value."
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that there was no available market
for the parachutes at the time of the breach and reasoned on this basis that the
measure of damages "is the loss directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary course
of events from the seller's breach of contract."'- It then stated that the holding of
the Czarnikow-Rionda case is applicable only to a situation where there is an available
market for the goods in question and the suing party is seeking special damages. 3 As
a consequence the appellate court held that the plaintiffs' loss of net resale profits was
the ordinary and general damages resulting from defendants' breach, apparently on
the ground that in the case at bar there was no available market.
A study of the opinion in the Czarnikow-Riondta case, however, fails to support
the appellate court's apparent understanding of the effect of that decision. Contrary to
what the appellate court assumed, the New York Court of Appeals in the Czar:ikow-
Rionda case merely applied the basic principle of the well-known decision in Hadley
v. Baxendale. The New York Court of Appeals, quoting from Williston on Con-
tracts,'4 stated: "If besides notice of contemplated resale the defendant also had
notice that other goods could not be obtained to supply the place of those not
delivered-then the profits of resale may be recovered; if there was no such notice
it would be held that loss of profits of a resale was not within the contemplation of
the parties."' 5 The reason given was: "It is the general rule that a purchaser of goods
9. Id. at 298.
10. 163 N.Y. 7, 57 N.E. 95 (1900)
11. It is interesting to note that the trial court cited the Latimer case as authority for
its method of computing market value. An analysis of other cases cited by the lower court
point out that it is only when the buyer is the defaulting party (in this case it was the
seller) that the seller's resale price may be used as evidence of the market value. Hence
this rule does not constitute authority to support the trial court's proposition. Van Brocklen
v. Smeallie, 140 N.Y. 70, 35 N.E. 415 (1893) and other cases cited in the lower court's
opinion at 111 F. Supp. 295, 298, 299.
12. Murarka et al. v. Bachrack Bros., Inc., 215 F. 2d 547, 554 (2nd Cir. 1954).
13. The appellate court (215 F. 2d 547, 554) distinguishes the Czarnikow-Rionda case
from the principal case on the ground that in the former the plaintiff was seeking "specdal
darnages" whereas in the latter the plaintiffs' loss of profits "constitutes general damages!'
The distinction between so-called special and general damages is a purely relative one. "At
the root of the problem is the distinction between general and special damages as it has been
developed in our law. There is need to keep in mind that the distinction is not absolute,
but relative." Kerr SS. Co., Inc., v. Radio Corporation of America, 245 N.Y. 284, 285,
157 N.E. 140, 141 (1927). Whether damages are special or general depends, in the situation
involved in the problem under discussion, upon the knowledge which the seller has at the
time of contracting, not later, of the availability of a market in case there should be a
breach. 15 Fordham L. Rev. 121 (1946).
14. 3 Wlliston, Contracts § 1347 (1936).
15. 255 N.Y. 33, 44, 173 N.E. 913, 916 (1930). The Court of Appeals cited Sedgwick
on Damages 162, and the following cases supporting the proposition announced: Hammond
& Co. v. Bussey, 20 Q.B.D. 79; Delafield v. J.K. Armsbey Co., 131 App. Div. 572, 116 N.Y.
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on contract, who has contracted to resell them to his own customer, for a non-delivery
by the original seller, is entitled only to general damages, for the reason that by resort
to the general market, he might have replaced the undelivered goods and thereby have
satisfied his customer."'16 The doctrine, then, of Hadley v. Baxendale is applicable
only to a situation where there is no market for the goods in question, and conse-
quently the said doctrine does apply to this case.
The appellate court, it would appear, erroneously interpreted the rule of the
Czarnikow-Rionda case as being applicable to situations where there is a market for the
goods; furthermore, the court cited the cases of Orester v. Dayton Rubber Mfg. Co., 7
Parrot v. Allison,18 and Emerman v. Cohen10 as supporting the proposition that the
loss of resale profits which plaintiffs have suffered as a result of defendants' breach,
may be recovered as general damages, despite the lack of notice on defendants' part as
to contracts to resell, and as to the absence of a market for the goods.
Analysis of these three cases points out that the appellate court was in erior in
citing these cases to support the proposition announced. In the Orester case the seller
was the sole source of a particular kind of tire which it had agreed to deliver to the
buyer and must have known at the time the contract was made that the buyer would
be unable to avoid loss of his resale profit by acquiring similar tires in the market.
Hence, in the Orester case, the lost profits were general damages. The Parrot and
Emerman cases cited the Orester case as standing for the rule announced in the
principal case. Such interpretation of the Orester case, however, in view of the fore-
going is not, it is submitted, correct.
In this case, then, it would appear that both the trial and appellate courts, faced
with the absence of a market to enable the recovery of the difference between the
market and contract prices, and impelled by the apparent injustice of the alternative
recovery, attempted by the methods outlined, to reach a more palatable conclusion.
Perhaps the appellate court felt, although this does not appear, that the defendant-
sellers should have reasonably foreseen that the plaintiff-buyers, because of the
nature of its business, intended a resale.20 However, if this was the reasoning of the
appellate court, it should have said so. Without reading this interpretation into the
court's opinion it would seem that it repudiated the principle of numerous cases, 1
including the Czarnikow-Rionda case, that to recover net resale profits a buyer must
prove that the seller knew or at least foresaw the probability when contracting, that
the buyer intended a resale, and that equivalent goods would not be later available
to the buyer in the event that the seller breached by non-delivery.
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-CONTEMPT PROCEEDING AGAINST AN ATTORNEY-SUMMARY
ACTION.-At the conclusion of a criminal proceeding for abortion, the attorney for
the defendant was summarily convicted of contempt, pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the
Supp. 71 (1st Dep't 1909) aff'd without opinion 199 N.Y. 518, 92 N.E. 1083 (1910); Carle-
ton v. Lombard, Ayres & Co., 149 N.Y. 137, 43 N.E. 422 (1896).
16. 255 N.Y. 33, 41, 173 N.E. 913, 915 (1930).
17. 228 N.Y. 134, 126 N.E. 510 (1920).
18. 145 F. 2d 415 (2d Cir. 1944).
19. 199 F. 2d 857 (2d Cir. 1952).
20. Booth v. Spuyten Duyvil Rolling Mill Co., 60 N.Y. 487 (1874).
21. Hammond & Co. v. Bussey, 20 Q.B.D. 79; Delafield v. J.K. Armsbey Co., 131 App.
Div. 572, 116 N.Y. Supp. 71 (1st Dep't 1909) aff'd without opinion 199 N.Y. 518, 92 N.E.
1083 (1910); Carleton v. Lombard, Ayres & Co., 149 N.Y. 137, 43 N.E. 422 (1896); Dreyer
Commission Co. v. Fruen Cereal Co., 148 Minn. 443, 182 N.W. 520 (1921).
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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for breaches of courtroom decorum. Upon
12 findings of "contumacious, unethical conduct in open court during the trial," the
attorney was sentenced to 10 days imprisonment. On petition to the Court of Ap-
peals, District of Columbia Circuit, the contempt finding was affirmed on 4 of the
12 counts, but confinement was reduced to 48 hours on the ground that the record
did not support the penalty imposed. Verbal exchanges on the part of both attorney
and trial judge were unusually vitriolic and exhibited an untoward disrespect for the
trial process, much less the amenities of court-room propriety. In response to its
administrative duty and to assure prudent exercise by district judges of the summary
power for punishing contempt, the Supreme Court reviewed the decision. Held,
three justices dissenting, conviction reversed and proceeding remanded for hearing
before another judge of the District Court, because the trial judge failed to represent
the impersonal authority of the law. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
The authority of a court to impose punitive contempt sentence has long been a
concomitant to the fair administration of justice. It is said to be inherent in the
judicial process' and has been legislatively pronounced in a variety of ways.2
Within the framework of criminal contempt is the distinction between summary
disposition and determination based on notice and a hearing where the contemptor
must show cause for non-punishment. 3 This summary power to hold a person in
contempt has been justified by the "need for immediate penal vindication of the
dignity of the court... " However where a contempt does not occur in open court
nor within the personal knowledge of the judge, the more tempered procedure must
follow.5 These differences in method have found expression in Rule 42(a) and 42(b)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.0
Difficulty and differences have arisen not so much as to what acts justify summary
proceeding as to the belated construction given its application, i.e., may a finding and
punishment without issue or trial avail after the threat to the orderly conduct of
trial has passed. Since the Supreme Court's authoritative decision in Sacher v. United
States,7 it appears conclusive that summary action may be taken at the termination
1. Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505 (U.S. 1873).
2. 18 U.S.CA. §§ 401, 402 (1948); See also N.Y. Judiciary Law, § 751.
3. Some jurists would go further and require a jury trial for a criminal contempt
imposed beyond the exigencies of the trial, as in the instant case in the concurring opinion
of Justices Black and Douglas based on their dissents in Sacher v. United States, 343 US. 1
(1952), and Isserman v. Ethics Committee, 345 U.S. 927 (1952). But to the effect that
Constitutional guaranties are not violated by a contempt conviction see Gompers v. United
States, 233 U.S. 604 (1914); Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, 134 US. 31 (1890); Michel-
son v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924) ; Fisher v. Pace, 336 US. 155 (1948).
4. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536 (1925).
5. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888); Savin Petitioner, 131 US. 267 (18S9); 4 BI.
Comm. 286.
6. Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a). Summary Disposition. "A criminal contempt may be punished
summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt
and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt shall
recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of record."; Fed. R. Crim. P.
42 (b) .. . .If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that
judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except with defendant's
consent . ..
7. 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
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of trial for acts committed during trial. This view is taken under the paramount
consideration for a speedy and just trial.8
In reversing the lower courts on the contempt finding in the instant decision, the
Supreme Court applied the rule of Cooke v. United States9 which declared that
in cases where a trial judge is personally embroiled, the alleged contempt should be tried
by another judge substituted for that very purpose.10 The reasoning behind this is
that an abuse of power may well result where the offense is colored by personalities
and judicial disinterest lessened. Opposed to the rule is the reasonableness of judicial
aloofness and integrity. In asserting the primacy of the Cooke decision the Court
made a veiled distinction in the later Sacker decision referred to above, and in
doing so, apparently left a divergent uncertainty in the administration of summary
contempt power by Federal judges. The issue of the case at hand was squarely
faced and decided by the Supreme Court in the Sacker decision,11 which affirmed
the contempt findings against defense attorneys for the Communist conspirators who
were convicted for violation of the Smith Act. In that decision, whose facts cannot
fairly be distinguished from the present except in degree, the court expressly con-
strued Rule 42. One of the chief objections, at issue here, viz., that the trial judge was
unwarranted in administering summary contempt because of his personal involvement,
was flatly rejected as contrary both to the weight of authority and to a proper con-
struction of the nile. The court in the Sacker case said: "The Rule itself expresses no
such limitation [judge's personal disqualification] and the contrary inference is al-
most inescapable. It is almost inevitable that any contempt of a court committed
in the presence of the judge during a trial will be an offense against his dignity and
authority. . . . It cannot be that summary punishment is only for such minor con-
tempts as leave the judge indifferent .. . . Such an interpretation would, in practice,
destroy the power it purports to grant."'12 As a further safeguard against a power-
wielding and hostile judge the Court cited the reviewing authority of the appellate
courts. The two dissenting opinions in the instant case rely on the Sacker decision
either expressly 13 or by implication, 14 and when contrasted with the dissents in the
Sacker case indicate tdoividual consistency if not a majority respect for the doctrine
of stare decisis. The majority opinion has recognized the former decision for empha-
sizing the right of an accused to fearless advocacy and the protection of orderly trial
8. Accord: Maclnnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 1952;
but for adverse criticism cf. 37 Cornell L.Q. 795 (1952), 36 Minn. L. Rev. 965 (1952), 6
Vand. L. Rev. 120 (1952), and for detailed criticism ante the Supreme Court's ruling, 60
Yale L. J. 1 (1951).
9. 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
10. Id. at 539. ". . . All we can say upon the whole matter is that where conditions do
not make it impractical, or where the delay may not injure public or private right, a judge
called upon to act in a case of contempt by personal attack upon him, may, without flinching
from his duty, properly ask that one of his fellow judges take his place." This requirement
is now found in subdivision (b) of Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which provides for disposition other than summary. See note 6 supra.
11. justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion is strikingly similar to his majority opinion
in the decision under consideration.
12. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952).
13. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 18 (1954). "I would not, after Sacher, apply
the Cooke case to the circumstances of this proceeding."
14. The other dissenting justices would affirm on authority of the Court of Appeals deci-
sion, which apparently assumed the correctness of the trial judge's participation. Offutt v,
United States, 208 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
[Vol. 24
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process, but not even evasively does it refer to the procedural standards set forth
in that decision---"Ve shall not retrace the ground so recently covered in the
Sacher case."15 Nor is it any way clear that the procedural instruction of the
Cooke decision was accepted as policy in the Federal courts prior to Sacher,20 and the
latter case should have foreclosed its operation. There is considerable authority for
the general proposition that a judge is not disqualified in contempt proceedings by
the fact that the contempt was committed against himself or a court of which he
was a member.' 7 Moreover, there seems to be little logic in applying the Cooke
rule, for that pronouncement was made on facts not calling for summary action--
the contemptuous act was in the form of a letter to the trial judge outside open
court. That decision reasoned that a summary conviction should not be permitted
where the contemptuous acts do not publicly impugn the court's dignity. In the
Sacher decision the minority urged that this reasoning should apply in situations
where the presiding judge tolerates offenses during trial and then undertakes to hold
counsel in contempt, hence proceeding other than summary. This was rejected as a
myopic view of summary contempt power but by inference the present decision
adopts the same when it invokes the impartial judge provision of the Coo.e decision.
Though the court has summoned an impressive argument for reversing the pro-
cedure, the rule's wisdom is not so weighted as to reconcile an avoidance of a recent
and commanding decision with the principle of precedent law. Nor is the doctrine
of stare decisis so flexible' s as to justify the result. Thus, it would appear that the
present decision tends to disrupt, without clarifying, that procedural stability which
the Federal rules are designed to establish.
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-PRoTECTION APFORDED BY WOnK PRODUCT THEORY NOT
EXTENDED TO THIRD PAzTms.-Three plaintiffs brought unconsolidated actions against
the same defendants in order to rescind purchases of revenue bonds on the grounds of
material misrepresentation. One of the plaintiffs had assigned its attorney the bridge
area of these actions. Reports of these investigations were prepared by the attorney
and submitted to his employer who thereupon delivered copies of said reports to the
other plaintiffs and also to others. Upon motion of one of the defendants in the United
States District Court, Southern District of New York under Rules 34 and 45 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against the three plaintiffs for production of the re-
ports, held, motions denied. The good cause required for production under Rule 34
was not shown by the moving party.' Connecticut Mt. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, et al.,
16 F.R.D. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
Rules 342 and 453 are two of the several deposition-discovery devices of the Federal
15. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13 (1954).
16. "Cases prior to it [Rule 42J grew out of facts so distinguishing that their decisions
are of little value as precedents." Sacher v. United States, 343 US. 1, 8 (1952).
17. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 US. 454
(19o7).
18. Cf. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 735 (1949); see 35 A.B.A.J. 541
(1949) for an appraisal.
1. Upon reargument in the United States District Court, Southern District of Nev, York,
it was held that motions for production of copies of the reports from the plaintiffs to whom
such copies were given, granted. The good cause required for production under the Rules
had been made which had not been made previously. Civil Action 91-247.
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
3. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45.
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Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 34 provides that the court in which an action is pend-
ing may, upon motion of a party showing good cause, order any party to the action to
produce and permit the inspection of designated documents. Rule 45, subdivision (b)
states that a subpoena may command a person to whom it is directed to produce desig-
nated documents. A motion under Rule 34 may be directed only to a party in the
action but a subpoena under Rule 45 may be directed to anyone, party or otherwise.
It is held that the requirements of Rule 34 with respect to good cause are also to be
read into Rule 45,4 but the former does not define what is sufficient to constitute good
cause. Cases considering this question have held that a sufficient showing of good
cause is made where it is shown that the documents sought to be produced merely are
relevant to the subject matter of the action.5 "There is no clear definition of what
constitutes good cause within the rule. . . . The relevancy and materiality of the
matter sought is an important element in the determination of whether there exists
good cause to grant the order."6 Other decisions have held that something more than
a showing of relevance is necessary to constitute good cause7 while some have denied
discovery if some other means are available to the moving party to ascertain the facts
which are sought.8 The courts have been reluctant to establish a universal definition
of good cause which may be applied in all cases but have rather reserved their discre-
tionary right to define the limits of good cause upon each particular set of facts and
circumstances. 9
The United States Supreme Court has held that a particular showing of good cause
must be shown when any of the deposition-discovery devices are used to inquire into
materials collected by an adverse party's counsel in the course of preparation for pos-
sible litigation.10 This rule which is applied to an attorney's work product requires
that production must be essential to one's case before discovery can properly be had,
and thus raises the degree of good cause ordinarily required under the Rules when such
product is sought.
The District Court in its decision denying production stated that the protection
afforded by this work product rule is not waived by voluntary disclosure to third
persons by the party claiming said protection."
The United States Supreme Court in enunciating this work product rule did not
define whether or not voluntary disclosure of the work product would result in waiver
of the protection afforded by said rule.12 Although other aspects of this work product
rule have been developed by the courts, there is an extreme paucity of cases consider-
ing this question. In Wild et al. v. Payson et al.,'8 it was held that, "Even if the
statement which is required to be produced herein could be construed to come within
the privilege described in the Hickman case, it is subject at least to the same infirmi-
4. Sagorsky et al. v. Malyon, 12 F.R.D. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
5. Gunderson v. Moran Transportation Corp., 15 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Hartford
Nat. Bank & Trust Co. et al. v. E.F. Drew & Co., Inc., 13 F.R.D. 127 (D. Del. 1952).
6. Wild et al. v. Payson et al., 7 F.R.D. 495, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
7. Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 558 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
8. McManus v. Harkness, 11 F.R.D. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
9. In the Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for
the United States District Courts, dated May, 1954, 16 F.R.D., prepared by the Advisory
Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, it is recommended that the requirement in Rule
34 that the party seeking discovery show good cause be eliminated.
10. Hickman, Adm'r, v. Taylor et al., 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
11. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. et al. v. Shields et al., 16 F.R.D. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
12. Hickman, Adm'r, v. Taylor et al., 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
13. 7 F.R.D. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
[Vol. 24
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ties as the rule of privilege invoked for testimonial exclusion."'14 It should be noted
that the Hickman case referred to in the Wild case was the decision of the Third
Circuit which had held work product to be "privileged."' 0 That disclosure of legal
opinion to outsiders waived all privilege as to them, specifically including work prod-
uct, was held in the recent case of United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co. et aLVa
In speaking of work product it was noted that, "In any event, the cloak of privacy
having been voluntarily lifted, there is no longer any reason to invoke the rule."lT
These holdings are in general accord with the theory that, "If one party or his attor-
ney reveals either type of data (a lawyer's work product or confidential communica-
tions from a client to his attorney) to another party or his attorney, the privilege
ordinarily accorded this material could be held waived because of disclosure to a third
person."' 8 These positions were refused by the District Court on the grounds that the
right to discovery of work product is determined apart from the consideration of
attorney-client privilege; thus, what effects a waiver of attorney-client privilege does
not necessarily effect a waiver of work product protection.10
This finding results in a very peculiar situation. When once it is determined that
certain documents are the work product of an attorney, it would be possible to dis-
close them to as many persons as may be desired and the protection under the work
product rule could never be lost. On reargument20 the court granted production from
the plaintiffs to whom such copies were given because good cause had been shown
under the Rules. This clearly implies that although the protection under the work
product rule is not waived by disclosure to third parties, such protection is not
extended to third parties. Thus, the finding that disclosure does not effect waiver has
no practical effect.
FILIATION PROCEEDINGS-JURISOICrrON OF NEW YoRz CITy COURT OF SPECAL SES-
sIoNs.-Complainant, a Connecticut resident, brought a complaint in the Court of
Special Sessions of the City of New York, alleging that defendant was the father
of her child, as yet unborn, and requesting that he be compelled to contribute to its
support, and to pay her necessary medical expenses. Defendant was a resident of
New Jersey, employed in New York. He moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that neither he nor the complainant were residents of New York, and that,
therefore, the court was without jurisdiction. The motion was denied. On appeal,
held, order reversed. The complaint should have been dismissed, since the defendant
was not a resident of New York, as required by the Domestic Relations Law. Car-
penter v. Justices of the Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York et al.,
283 App. Div. 212, 127 N.Y.S.2d 140 (1st Dep't 1954).
14. Id. at 500.
15. 153 F. 2d 212 (3rd Cir. 1945).
16. 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
17. Id. at 465.
18. Note, Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege on Inter-Attorney Exchange of Informa-
tion, 63 Yale LJ. 1030, 1031 (1954).
19. Connecticut Mlut. Life Ins. Co. et al. v. Shields et al., 16 F.R.D. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
20. Civil Action 91-247 (S.D.N.Y.). Defendant's motion for leave to reargue was based
on the grounds that, although, on the original motion, production was sought from the
party whose work product it was under Rule 34, and from the other parties to whom the
work product was given under Rule 45, the decision in denying the motion alluded to the
production sought under Rule 34 and in no way referred to production under Rule 45.
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A filiation proceeding is a proceeding brought to determine the father of a child
born out of wedlock. It may be brought before the birth of the child or after, pro-
vided that, if instituted after the birth of the child, it is instituted within two years
after birth.' It is a purely statutory proceeding, 2 covered by article 8 of the Do-
mestic Relations Law,3 and also, in New York City, by article 5 of the New York
City Criminal Courts Act,4 which specifies that the Court of Special Sessions has
exclusive jurisdiction. 5
Under the common law, up until the last century, there was no such thing as a
filiation proceeding, the illegitimate child automatically becoming a burden upon
that segment of the community in which he or she resided.0 Then, with the de-
velopment of social consciousness and the recognition of the moral obligation of the
putative father to support his natural offspring, the legislature began to remove the
common law restrictions against filiation proceedings. As a result, an unwed mother
today, who can prove the paternity of the putative father under our statutes, ex-
periences little or no difficulty in obtaining support for her child.1
Until the decision in the instant case, however, New York was faced with a juris-
dictional problem born of the conflicting language in its paternity statutes, Section
135 of the Domestic Relations Law provides that a non-resident mother may bring
a paternity action in New York State provided that the alleged father is a resident
of this state.8 Section 122 of the Domestic Relations Law and section 64 of the
New York City Criminal Courts Act provide that paternity proceedings may be in-
stituted wherever the mother, child, or putative father resides or is found, making
1. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law, § 122. The statute specifically exempts public welfare officials
from the time limitation, providing that they may institute proceedings where a child up to
sixteen years of age is or is liable to become a public charge.
2. Schneider v. Kennatt, 267 App. Div. 589, 591, 47 N.Y.S.2d 180, 182 (1st Dep't 1944).
3. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law, art. 8, entitled "Support and Education of Children Born Out
of Wedlock, and Proceedings to Establish Paternity."
4. N.Y.C. Crim. Cts. Act, art. 5, entitled "Paternity Proceedings." This article also
pertains to support and education.
5. N.Y.C. Crim. Cts. Act, § 60. N.Y. Dom. Re]. Law, § 122 specifies that the courts
previously exercising such jurisdiction in New York City shall continue to do so.
6. "At the common law, the father of an illegitimate child was not liable for the support
of either the child or the mother." Feyler v. Mortimer, 299 N.Y. 309, 313, 87 N.E.2d 273
(1949). The court points out that the primary purpose for the legislative changes was
to remove from communities the burden of supporting fatherless children. See also Reg.
v. Blane, [18491 13 Q.B. 769 and R. v. Humphreys, [1914] 3 K.B. 1237.
7. Section 122 of the Domestic Relations Law specifies who may bring an action In New
York State. Within the limitations of section 135 of the Domestic Relations Law, as
defined in the instant case and in Feyler v. Mortimer, 299 N.Y. 309, 87 N.E.2d 273 (1949),
it allows proceedings to be instituted in the county where the mother, child, or putative
father resides or is found. Section 71 of the New York City Criminal Courts Act provides
that the judgment of any court of competent jurisdiction in this state or any other state
in a paternity proceeding shall have the force and effect of a judgment in the Court of
Special Sessions if enforcement is sought in that court. See also Hacker v. Anon., 163
Misc. 832, 299 N.Y. Supp. 460 (City Ct. Albany 1937), in which the court points out that
once paternity has been determined, the liability of the putative father is absolute.
8. "It is not a bar to the jurisdiction of the court that the complaining mother or child
resides in another county or state, if the defendant be a resident of this state." N.Y. Dom.
Rel. Law § 135.
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no distinction between resident and non-resident mothers.3 The problem then, as
to non-resident mothers, was as to which section of the Domestic Relations Law
would control. In the case under discussion the Appellate Division based its holding
on section 135 of the Domestic Relations Law, which reads in part: "It shall not be
a bar to the jurisdiction of the court if the complaining mother or child resides in
another county or state, if the defendant be a resident of this state." The Court
of Special Sessions had ruled that it was sufficient that the putative father was
found in New York City, holding that section 135 of the Domestic Relations Law
did not apply. This latter ruling was based on a distinction between the facts of the
instant case and those of Feyler v. Mortitmer,'° in which the Court of Appeals had
held that an unwed mother who was not a United States citizen could not bring a
paternity action in New York State. The mother in the Mortimer case was a German
national, both at the time her child was born in Germany in 1946 and at the time
the action was brought. She never left Germany, but mailed a complaint to the
Court of Special Sessions, the defendant being a New York resident. The Court of
Appeals decided that section 135 is controlling in all interpretations of -ection 122
of the Domestic Relations Law and section 64 of the New York City Criminal
Courts Act, and since the legislature did not use such words as "a foreign country,"
or "any other jurisdiction," it had limited the application of the statute to American
mothers.
In the case under discussion, then, insofar as the plaintiff mother was a United States
citizen, the ruling of the court at Special Sessions was correct. The Appellate Division,
however, based its decision upon the final clause of section 135, stating that the
jurisdiction of the Court of Special Sessions in filiation proceedings brought by non-
resident mothers is dependent upon whether the putative father resides in New York
State. The court noted that this section is taken almost verbatim from the Uniform
Illegitimacy Act,"l but pointed out that the clause, "if the defendant be a resident
of this state," was added by the New York State Legislature.
There is another distinction between Feyler v. Mortimer and the case under discus-
sion which deserves attention. The alleged father in the case under discussion was
a New Jersey resident, while the alleged father in the case of Feyler v. Mortimer
was a resident of New York. Yet, the decisions in the two cases do not conflict, since
each was decided on a different point, the latter on the necessity of citizenship of the
non-resident mother, and the former on the requirement of residence of the alleged
father when the mother is a non-resident citizen.
The decision in the instant case, it appears, would limit the jurisdiction of the
9. "Complaints may be made in the county where the mother or child reddes or is
found or in the county where the putative father resides or is found. The fact that the
child was born outside of the state of New York shll not be a bar to entering a complaint
against the putative father in any county where he resides or is found, or in the county
where the mother resides or the child is found." N.Y. Dora. Rel. Law, § 122. "Proceedings
may be instituted if the mother or child resides or is found in the city of New York, or if
the putative father resides or is found in the city of New York. The fact that the child was
born outside of the state of New York shall not be a bar to instituting proceedings against
the putative father in the city of New York if he resides or is found therein, or if the
mother resides or the child is found therein." N.Y.C. Crim. Cts. Act § 164.
10. 299 N.Y. 309, 87 NE.2d 273 (1949).
11. "Jurisdiction over proceedings to compel support is vested in the - court of
the - in which the alleged father is permanently or temporarily resident, or in which
the mother or child resides or is found. It is not a bar to the jurisdiction of the court that
the complaining mother or child resides in another state." Uniform Illegitimacy Act, § 133.
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Court of Special Sessions in paternity proceedings at least to the point where one
of the parties is a New York resident. It has followed the rule that since these
statutes are in derogation of the common law, they must be strictly construed. 12
Prior to the decision in Feyler v. Mortimer, in which it was held that section 135
controlled in any interpretation of article 8 of the Domestic Relations Law on juris-
dictional questions, it was possible to interpret the statutes as giving jurisdiction
whenever the parties to a filiation proceeding appeared in person before the court. 18
Then, when the Court of Appeals ruled that foreign mothers could not bring a pa-
ternity action in this state, it not only imposed the first restriction on the application
of this statute, but also eliminated the possibility of our courts becoming involved in
questions of foreign law, since the status of a foreign born child as an illegitimate
would have to be determined under the laws of the foreign country, and would not be
a subject for our bastardy laws.14 But this latest limitation, imposed in the instant
case, requiring that at least one of the parties to a filiation proceeding be a resi-
dent of this state, is to be commended not only from the point of view that it gives
an answer to the question as to how these statutes are to be interpreted in juris-
dictional questions, 15 but also because its restriction will help to limit the number
of these cases which may be brought before the Court of Special Sessions. With the
calendar of that court already crowded, it hardly seems sound policy, where the
issue is debatable, for that court also to be accorded jurisdiction to determine the
problems of out-of-state parties.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-PHYSICAL INJURIES CAUSED BY FRIGHT OR SHOCK WHERIE
THERE is NO CONTACT-Due to the negligence of guards at Auburn Prison a prisoner
was allowed to escape. The prisoner forced the plaintiff's decedent to drive him to
Syracuse. Fright caused the decedent to suffer a brain hemorrhage from which he died
shortly thereafter. The prisoner was known to be armed with a cultivator blade but
there was no proof that he at any time touched the decedent. The Court of Claims
held that plaintiff could recover against the state for death caused by fright even though
it was unaccompanied by any contact or immediate physical injury. Upon appeal,
12. "In this State, the responsibility of the father . . .exists only by virtue of statute.
The proceedings ...are defined and controlled exclusively by the statutes which must be
in their substance strictly and fully complied with." Schneider v. Kennatt, 267 App. Div.
589, 591, 47 N.Y.S. 2d 180, 182 (1st Dep't 1944).
13. "While there is no authoritative definition of 'is found,' those words are taken to
mean appears in person before the court." Angarita v. Court of Special Sessions, 203 Misc.
12, 13, 113 N.Y.S. 2d 196, 198 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1952). While this is a later case which
followed the decision of Feyler v. Mortimer in a similar set of circumstances, the court's
interpretation of the words "is found" serves to show the latitude of jurisdiction which
would have ensued had the Court of Appeals not made section 135 the controlling section
in jurisdictional questions in these proceedings.
14. "Assuming that the magistrate who made this order has examined the law of France,
and ascertained that according to that law the child is a bastard, we are clearly of the
opinion that children born out of this country are not the subject of our bastardy laws."
Reg. v. Blane, [1849) 13 Q.B. 769. The subject was not discussed by the Court of Appeals
in the Mortimer case, yet its ruling eliminated it as a problem for the future. This question
is fully covered by Shatkin, in his book, Disputed Paternity Proceedings, 390-408 (3rd ed.
1953).
15. But see 40 Cornell L.Q. 128 (1954) for a discussion of the effect of this restrictive
point of view on the rights of the mother and child.
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held, two justices dissenting, affirmed per curiam. Williams etc. v. State of Ncw York,
284 App. Div. 1027, 134 N.Y.S. 2d 857 (4th Dep't 1954). The New York rule,
established by Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co.," has been that no recovery could be had
for injuries sustained by fright occasioned by the negligence of another where there
was no immediate personal injury.2 In the Mitchell case, the plaintiff was standing on
a crosswalk awaiting an opportunity to board a horse car when a car of the defendant
came down the street, turning sharply to the right. The team attached to the car came
so dose to the plaintiff that she was between the horses' heads when they stopped. As
a result, she suffered a miscarriage and consequent illness. The court denied a recovery
since there was no immediate personal injury.
The English and later the American cases not only narrowed the scope of the
Mitchell rule, but they have diminished the value of the three basic reasons given by
the court for that rule. The first of these reasons for not allowing recovery for physical
injuries resulting from fright was that fright alone could not form the basis of an
action. In Dulieu v. Whitea the court held that it was unreasonable and contrary to
the weight of authority to contend that fright-where physical injury is directly pro-
duced by it-cannot be a ground of action merely because of the absence of any ac-
companying impact. It is true that no recovery can be had for fright alone but when
the fright results in an actual physical injury, a different rule prevails.' Judge Cardozo
in Comstock v. Wilson5 completely repudiates the first reason set out in the Mitchell
case. His opinion states that, "Mental suffering or disturbance, even without conse-
quences of physical injury, may in fact constitute actual damage; nevertheless the
courts generally do not regard it as such damage as gives rise to a cause of action,
though it be the direct result of the careless act. Whether the true explanation of that
conclusion lies in an historical conception of injury or in supposed considerations of
public policy may for the present be put aside. In either event, the reason fails where
fright or nervous shock causes visible physical injury."0
The second underlying reason for the no recovery rule set out in the Mitchell case is
that if the right of recovery was established it would result in a flood of litigation in
cases where the injuries complained of might be easily feigned without detection, and
where the damages must rest upon mere conjecture and speculation. Expediency would
take precedence over justice if this reason were to prevail. Difficulty of discovery is not
1. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
2. The English case upon which the Mitchell rule is based is ictorian Ry. Comm. v.
Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222, 8 Eng. Rul. Cas. 405 (1888). It has long since been overruled
by Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669. In Coyle v. Watson, [1891] A.C. 1, Lord
Shaw says of the Coultas case, "I am humbly of opinion that the case can no longer be
treated as a decision of guiding authority."; see also Pugh v. London Brighton and South
Coast Ry., 2 Q.B. 248 (1896).
3. [1901] 2 K.B .669.
4. Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y. Supp. 39 (1st Dep't 1914).
5. 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931). Plaintiff's testatrix was riding in an automobile
which was involved in a collision with defendant's negligently driven automobile. The
collision caused "a grating sound" and loosened a fender on the car in which plaintiffs
testatrix was riding. Plaintiff's testatrix stepped from the auto and while she was writing
down the defendant's name she fainted, fell and fractured her skull. She died about twenty
minutes afterward. Plaintiff was allowed to recover. The court distinguishes this case from
the Mitchell case on the ground that here there was a collision even though the plaintiff
suffered no injury in the accident itself. There was some impact, at least a jar to the
deceased.
6. Id. at 235, 177 N.E. at 432.
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sufficient reason to foreclose against the proximate results of negligence.1 Further, It is
to be noted that we are speaking of actual physical injuries. If they exist, they are no
harder to detect than many of those directly caused by impact for which recovery is al-
lowed. (E.g., back and spinal injuries, post-concussion syndromes, etc.; all of which are
considerably easier to feign than a miscarriage or a cerebral hemorrhage.) Nor is this
rule consistent. It allows recovery for injuries caused by shock when there is any con-
tact or jar, however slight.8 It would seem just as easy to feign such injuries and as
difficult to disprove them in such cases as in cases where there is no contact or jar and
fright alone is the intervening agency of transmittal. The impact requirement exists to
guarantee a causal relationship between the negligence and the injuries. But if, without
impact, this causal relation can reasonably be shown, impact should not be essential to
recovery. 9 Where a plaintiff, by his own agility or sheer good luck, narrowly avoids
contact with a defendant's negligently driven vehicle but suffers physical injury due to
fright, it cannot be said that the defendant is not liable for the injuries which he
caused because he did not further injure the plaintiff by actual contact. 10 Massachu-
setts partially solves the problem by allowing recovery for physical injury not resulting
solely from mental shock or emotional disturbances.11 Other jurisdictions allow
recovery where falling or fainting results in physical injury without evidence of any
contact or jar to the plaintiff's person. 12 Twomley v. Central Park, etc., R.R. 13
7. Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 AtU. 202, 206 (1907). "When It Is
admitted . . . that in a large class of cases there may be injuries of the most serious
character directly resulting from the negligence of the defendant, as a proximate cause, for
which the law will afford no remedy because of some probate difficulty or occasional In-
justice in the administration of a more liberal rule, it appears to us that the conclusion Is
quite illogical and is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of the courts of
justice."
8. Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931). In Mundy v. Levy Bros.
Realty Co., 184 App. Div. 467, 170 N.Y. Supp. 994 (2d Dep't 1918) plaintiff recovered for
injuries caused by shock when a door fell down an elevator shaft and jarred the floor upon
which she was standing. In Wood v. New York Central & H.R.R. Co., 83 App. Div. 604, 82
N.Y. Supp. 160 (4th Dep't 1903), aff'd, 179 N.Y. 557, 71 N.E. 1142 (1904) plaintiff In
trying to control his horse in the path of defendant's engine was jostled in his seat. I-Ic
could recover for the consequences of shock.
9. Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 Atl. 540 (1930);
Prosser on Torts, § 34 (1st ed. 1941) states: "... so far as substantial justice Is concerned,
it would seem that there may be equal assurance that the mental disturbance Is genuine
when the plaintiff escapes 'impact' by a yard. A slight but increasing majority of the courts
have repudiated the requirement of 'impact', and have regarded the physical consequences
themselves, or the circumstances of the accident, as sufficient guarantee .... There must
necessarily be some requirement of satisfactory proof. .. ."
10. Maloney v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 229 App. Div. 317, 241 N.Y. Supp. 160 (1st
Dep't 1930). In this case it was not certain whether defendant's horse actually touched the
plaintiff, who sustained a broken leg in his effort to avoid being struck. The trial court was
reversed because it charged the jury that it followed that if the plaintiff's injury was re-
ceived by reason of fright and not by any physical contact between the property of the
defendant and the plaintiff, that they must find a verdict for the defendant. See also
Restatement, Torts § 436.
11. Freedman v. Eastern Mass. St. Ry. Co. and Freedman v. Fall River Gas Works Co.,
299 Mass. 246, 12 N.E. 2d 739 (1938). A passenger on a streetcar who jumped and twisted
her shoulder in apprehension of an impending collision was allowed to recover.
12. Block v. Pascucci, 111 Conn. 58, 149 AtI. 210 (1930); Howarth v. Adams Express
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(decided nineteen years before the Mitchell case) and Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co.14
indicate that New York is inclined toward the same view; namely that, even though
there is no contact or jar, there may be a recovery if the defendant's negligence is
the proximate cause of physical injuries sustained by the plaintiff where he fell
or fainted due to the intervening agency of fright or shock. There is no reason why
this rule might not be extended to include all physical injuries (miscarriages, brain
hemorrhages, etc.) when they are proved to have been proximately caused by the
defendant's negligence.
The third reason offered in the Mitchell case for not allowing recovery for the
consequences of shock and fright when there is no contact or jar is that the injury
in such cases is not the proximate result of the negligence. It is well settled that the
problem of proximate cause is a question for the jury unless it is not open to a
reasonable difference of opinion.15 However, if there was any value to this particular
holding in the Mitchell case, it certainly has been undermined by the later decisions
in'6 and out of' 7 New York. In all of these cases, recovery was allowed where
shock was a link in the chain of causality. The courts could not have so held
without deciding not only that the shock did not break the chain of causality, but
also that the shock and the consequent injuries were the proximate result of the
defendant's negligence.' 8 Since it has been established that without contact or
impact there may still be a tort,10 the only valid objection to recovery in such a
Co., 269 Pa. 280, 112 AtI. 536 (1921); Conley v. United Drug. Co., 218 Mass. 238, 10S
N.E. 975 (1914).
13. 69 N.Y. 158 (1877). The plaintiff was allowed to recover where, anticipating that
the car in which she was a passenger would be struck by an approaching train due to the
negligent manner in which the vehicle was being driven, he leaped from the car, fell and
was injured. The court said, "The misconduct of the persons in charge of the car was the
proximate cause of the injury, without concurrent negligence on the part of the plaintiff."
14. Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y. Supp. 39 (1st Dep't 1914).
Plaintiff recovered for injuries sustained when, frightened at seeing her children ascending
in an unattended elevator, she fainted and fell into the elevator shaft.
15. Restatement, Torts § 434.
16. Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931). In Mundy v. Levy, 184
App. Div. 467, 470, 170 N.Y. Supp. 994, 995 (2d Dep't 1918) the court said: ". . . the
Cohn and Wood Cases ... are authority that the chain of cause and effect is not broken
because one link in the chain is the present effect upon the mind and nerves of plaintiff
without trespass on her person."; Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y.
Supp. 39 (1st Dep't 1914) ; Wood v. N.Y. Central & H.R.R. Co., 83 App. Div. 604, 82 N.Y.
Supp. 160 (4th Dep't 1903), aff'd, 179 N.Y. 557, 71 N.E. 1142 (1904); Maloney v. Knicker-
bocker Ice Co., 229 App. Div. 317, 241 N.Y. Supp. 160 (1st Dep't 1930). It is not denied that
there are several cases during the same period adhering to the Mitchell rule, but none reached
the New York Court of Appeals.
17. Block v. Pascucci, 111 Conn. 58, 149 AU. 210 (1930); Freedman v. Eastern Mass.
St. Ry. Co., 299 Mass. 246, 12 N.E. 2d 739 (1938); Conley v. United Drug, 218 Mass. 233,
105 N.E. 975 (1914); Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 AfU.
540 (1930) ; Howarth v. Adams, 269 Pa. 280, 112 At. 536 (1921) ; Simone v. Rhode Island
Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 Atl. 202 (1907) ; Dulleu v. White, 2 K.B. 669 (1901).
18. 1 Warren, Negligence, 35 and cases cited.
19. Twomley v. The Central Park North and East River R-R. Co., 69 N.Y. 158; Maloney
v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 229 App. Div. 317, 241 N.Y. Supp. 160 (1st Dep't 1930); Cohn
v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y. Supp. 39 (1st Dep't 1914); Simone v.
RI. Co., 28 RI. 186, 66 AUt. 202 (1907); Coyle v. Watson, [1918] A.C. 1; Dulieu v. White,
(1901] 2 K.B. 669; Prosser on Torts § 34 (1st ed. 1941) ; Restatement, Torts § 436.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
cause of action is that the physical injury consequent upon the mental disturbance
or shock is not a proximate result of the tort2 o and this, as we have seen, is a
problem for the jury.
As is noted by the court in the instant case, the scope of the no recovery rule has
been further narrowed by New York courts which have allowed exceptions to the
rule in cases involving contaminated food 2l and wanton torts.22 In allowing recovery
for physical injury without any contact or jar, Williams v. State of New York is in
direct conflict with the Mitchell case and represents a culmination of the advances
made since Mitchell v. Rochester toward a more liberal rule. It is submitted that
returning this class of cases to the province of proximate cause and thereby con-
forming to the general principles of negligence is the most reasonable and equitable
course for the courts to follow.
WILLS-CONDITION IN TEsTATOR'S WILL NOT TO MARRY OUTSIDE OF A PARTICULAR
FAITH HELD NOT TO APPLY TO APPoINTEE.-In an action for the construction of
testator's will, the trustees thereunder sought to establish that testator's granddaughter
would forfeit her right to take were she, contrary to provisions in the will, to marry
someone not born in the Jewish faith and not of Jewish blood. She contemplated mar-
rying one concededly not of the Jewish faith. Testator's will had granted a power of
appointment to his son whereunder he appointed the principal and one-half of the in-
terest in the income of the trust to respondent. The Surrogate's Court decreed that the
condition in restraint of marriage to one not of the Jewish faith was valid and applied
to testator's granddaughter. The Appellate Division, First Department, reversed, two
justices dissenting, holding the condition valid, but not applicable to the granddaughter
because she derived her interest not directly from testator's will but by a power of
appointment through her father. On appeal, held, three judges dissenting, affirmed.
In re Rosenthal's Will, 307 N.Y. 715, 121 N.E. 2d 539 (1954).
The first problem presented is whether or not the condition imposed by testator's
will was void as against public policy. The authorities in New York seem well settled
that a condition not to marry out of a particular faith is valid. Conditions in general
restraint of marriage were regarded at common law as void.' Conditions in partial
restraint of marriage which merely imposed reasonable restrictions upon marriage are
not against public policy.2 A prohibition against marrying outside the Jewish faith has
been held as valid. 3 A legacy conditioned on the legatee being reared as a Roman
Catholic has been upheld as valid.4 In the present case, all three courts apparently
agreed that the condition in testator's will was valid.
The problem presented was whether this condition applied to testator's grand-
daughter. It is well settled that a person who accepts a benefit under a will must
accept the contents of the instrument, conforming to all its provisions and renouncing
20. Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931).
21. Barrington v. Hotel Astor, 184 App. Div. 317, 171 N.Y. Supp. 840 (1st Dep't 1918).
22. Beck v. Libraro, 220 App. Div. 547, 221 N.Y. Supp. 737 (2d Dep't 1927).
1. Matter of Seaman, 218 N.Y. 77, 112 N.E. 576 (1916).
2. Matter of Liberman, 279 N.Y. 458, 18 N.E. 2d 658 (1939).
3. In Matter of Weil, 124 Misc. 692, 209 N.Y. Supp. 779 (Surr. Ct. 1925), aft d, 216
App. Div. 701, 213 N.Y. Supp. 933 (1st Dep't 1926). Although the condition was held valid,
it did not affect the bequest in issue.
4. Matter of Kempf, 252 App. Div. 28, 297 N.Y. Supp. 307 (4th Dep't 1937), aff'd, 278
N.Y. 613, 16 N.E. 2d 123 (1938).
(Vol. 24
1955] RECENT DECISIONS 157
every right inconsistent with it.5 A will is to be interpreted in the light of the intent
of the testator. 6 "'When the intent is ascertained, it is almost blindly followed." T The
intention is to be ascertained from the whole will taken together rather than from any
particular provision considered by itself.8 "When the intention is ascertained, the
mode of expression, or an inadvertent omission in some particular, should be subor-
dinated to the intent without regard to technical objections if in harmony with the
general scheme and purpose of the will."0 In the case under discussion, testator pro-
vided that if any of his descendants married a non-Jewish spouse, "all legades and
devises . . . and all powers of appointment given, devised and bequeathed to such
child or descendant ... shall be cancelled, annulled and revoked... 2,10 He
further provided that spouses of his Jewish descendants and his descendants, not of
the Jewish faith and blood would not be entitled to take any share in his estate either
as ". . . legatee, devisee, appointee, heir at law or next of kin, distributee or other-
wise."'" The majority of the Appellate Division held that the failure of testator to
insert the word "appointee" in referring to Jewish descendants, manifested his intent
to exclude his granddaughter from the condition not to marry a non-Jewish spouse.
She was the appointee under the will of her father who received the power of appoint-
ment from the testator's will. The court further said that an appointee gets his
interest through the power of appointment of the donee and not by a legacy or devise
of the donor. Since the draftsman was competent it was concluded that by using the
words "legacies and devises" he intended to exclude the appointee from the condition
prohibiting the act of intermarriage.
It is submitted that the intention of the testator was not to exclude his grand-
daughter from the condition. Throughout the will it is obvious that he had strong
views against intermarriage. In referring to jewels already given to his daughters, the
testator expressed his desire that they give said jewels to their children and/or their
children's children "who shall not have married outside of the Jewish race and
faith."' 2 He expressly conditioned the powers of appointment which he gave to his
grandson, that if he married outside the Jewish faith, he too would forfeit his rights
and powers of appointment. It would not seem logical, therefore, to say that the
testator would so limit the appointor, yet exclude the appointee, and that his strong
distaste for intermarriage suddenly ceased when it came to his granddaughter, who at
the time of the making of the will, was unknown.
The testator used the words ". . . give, devise and bequeath . ."13 in referring
to the interest which would pass to the appointees as recipients of the trust. The words
used in the clause restraining intermarriage are ". . . all legacies and devises ....
given, devised and bequeathed to such child ... shall be cancelled."' 4 It would
seem that from his prior use of the words "given, devised, and bequeathed" the
testator intended to include in the prohibitive condition the interest which passed to
the appointee, by referring to that interest as a legacy or devise.
5. Oliver v. Wells, 254 N.Y. 451, 173 N.E. 676 (1930).
6. Crozier v. Bray, 120 N.Y. 366, 24 N.E. 712 (1890).
7. Id. at 376, 24 N.E. at 718.
8. Williams v. Jones, 166 N.Y. 522, 60 N.E. 240 (1901).
9. Id. at 533, 60 N.E. at 247.
10. In re Rosenthal's Will, 204 Misc. 432, 434, 123 N.Y.S. 2d 326, 330 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
(Emphasis Supplied)
11. Ibid. (Emphasis Supplied)
12. Id. at 438, 123 N.Y.S. 2d at 335.
13. Id. at 439, 123 N.Y.S. 2d at 336.
14. Id. at 434, 123 N.Y.S. 2d at 330.
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"... Those who take under a power of appointment take as if their names were
in the grant of power."' 5 Matter of Walbridge'6 further describes the relationship in
this language: "The wills of the donor and the donee must be read together as part of
the same instrument . . . [the property] . . . is not the property of the donee but of
the donor until it absolutely vests in some person or corporation. A donee with a
power to appoint by will is a mere agent of the donor."' 7 In testing the validity and
effect of the exercise of a power of appointment, the fundamental rule is that the law
of the domicile of the donor governs all questions relating to the validity and effect of
the exercise of the power and the method of distribution of the appointive fund. 18
The property to be appointed is not that of the donee, but of the donor, and that
appointment of property is not a disposition of the latter's property, but an appoint-
ment of testator's property under the powers conferred upon donee by donor.1' In
Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Mortimer,2 0 the court refused to uphold an act by the
donee which would defeat the donor's declaration. It appears, therefore, from the
cases and rules cited above, that the law today in New York is that the interest
passing to an appointee comes from the donor to the appointee, the donee acting only
as an agent to fulfill the wishes of the donor. It would seem, therefore, that an interest
which passes to the appointee through the donee, can properly be considered a "devise"
or "legacy" of the donor, as those words were used in the testator's will.
But the Appellate Division in the present case says: "The ficition of 'relation
back'2 ' cannot be stretched to constitute authority for the proposition that in this
proceeding petitioner's interest through appointment must be adjudged a legacy or
devise."22 Since this theory of relation back is applied in questions of jurisdiction, 28
for tax purposes,24 in not allowing the acts of a donee to interfere with the intent of
the donor,2 5 there would appear to be no reason to exclude it, when interpreting the
language used in a will.
The previous use of the words "give, devise, and bequeath" used by the testator in
referring to the appointees, the language of the courts treating the interest passing to
an appointee as coming directly from the donor (the donee acting merely as an agent),
and the open hostility of the testator towards mixed marriage lead to the conclusion
that his granddaughter's interest was conditioned on her marrying a person of the
Jewish faith.
15. Matter of Harbeck, 161 N.Y. 211, 218, 55 N.E. 850, 852 (1900). This case dealt with
a tax question and determined that the date of the donor's will would be applied to a grant
to an appointee.
16. 178 Misc. 32, 33 N.Y.S. 2d 47 (Surr. Ct. 1942).
17. Id. at 37, 33 N.Y.S. 2d at 52.
18. Matter of N.Y. Life Insurance and Trust Co., 139 N.Y. Supp. 695 (Surr. Ct.), aff'd,
157 App. Div. 916, 142 N.Y. Supp. 1132 (lst Dep't), aff'd, 209 N.Y. 585, 103 N.E. 315 (1913).
19. Sewell v. Wilmer, 132 Mass. 131 (1882).
20. 219 N.Y. 290, 114 N.E. 389 (1916).
21. This theory of "relation back" as used by the court refers to relating the interest to
the appointee back to the grant of the donor.
22. In re Rosenthal's Will, 283 App. Div. 316, 320, 127 N.Y.S. 2d 778, 781 (1st Dep't
1954).
23. Matter of Walbridge, 178 Misc. 32, 33 N.Y.S. 2d 47 (Surr. Ct. 1942); Matter of
N.Y. Life Ins. and Trust Co., 139 N.Y. Supp. 695 (Surr. Ct.), aff'd, 157 App, Div. 916, 142
N.Y. Supp. 1132 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 209 N.Y. 585,103 N.E. 315 (1913).
24. Matter of Harbeck, 161 N.Y. 211, 55 N.E. 850 (1900).
25. Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Mortimer, 219 N.Y. 290, 114 N.E. 389 (1916).
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